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It is better to walk straight into the wind of  the future than to enter into the 
future backwards or to head straight back into the past.
François Laruelle – Philosophy and Non-Philosophy
Although the problem of  time has remained central to philosophical enquiry 
since at least Anaximander, it is only really in the work of  Aristotle – or more 
specifically, in Physics IV, that most foundational of  metaphysical texts – that it 
is really considered on its own terms, as time qua time. It is in this context of  
Aristotle’s ontology of  nature, remarks Martin Heidegger, that “the ordinary 
way of  understanding time has received its first thematically detailed tradi-
tional interpretation.”1 Yet even Aristotle’s notoriously obscure examination 
of  time pales in terms of  import to that of  Saint Augustine, whose compara-
tively lucid account would provide the basic template for Western metaphys-
ics’ conceptualization of  temporality until the rise of  phenomenology in the 
early twentieth century. Augustine concludes that in a strictly objective sense 
“neither the future nor the past exist,” and instead, we should speak of  “three 
times, a present of  past things, a present of  present things, and a present of  
future things.”2 When we speak of  time in the conventional sense, he contin-
ues, we are speaking of  phenomena that exist only in the mind: “the present 
of  past things is the memory; the present of  present things is direct percep-
1  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1962), 414.
2  Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin, 1961), 269.
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tion; and the present of  future things is expectation.”3
 In proposing this, Augustine accounts for the future as a mere present-
to-come, an assurance that as the present passes away, a new present will come 
to replace it. For François Laruelle (following a line of  thought inaugurated 
by Heidegger), however, this understanding of  the future, filled with positive 
content, reflects a philosophical inability to think outside of  the present, and 
thus, to think the future in its own right, rather than as a mere reiteration of  
said presence. His project of  non-philosophy strives to “make a tabula rasa 
of  the future” – to embrace a futurality that is neither shackled to the past that 
precedes it, nor locked into a cycle of  permanent revolution, but rather, is 
emptied of  all content.4 This is a future that is not already mixed or reversible 
with the past and the present, but is entirely and irreducibly futural in nature. 
In particular, Laruelle’s work provokes us to consider the fate of  philosophy 
itself, and the extent to which this discipline is capable of  contemplating a 
future that is not already colonized by its concepts and categories – not so 
much a future without philosophy (for philosophers themselves frequently 
pronounce the death of  their field), but one that cannot be foreseen within 
the strictures of  philosophical discursiveness.
  Of  course, Laruelle is not alone in this endeavor. Continental philos-
ophy in the twentieth century has recurrently occupied itself  with this desire 
to conceive of  a future without content: Heidegger’s authentic temporality of  
anticipatory resoluteness, Derrida’s messianism-without-messiah, Deleuze’s 
eternal return, Badiou’s event, most recently Meillassoux’s hyper-chaos – all 
strive to uncover (or recover) a radical futurity unfettered by the seemingly 
endless repetitions of  the past. Yet from the viewpoint of  non-philosophy, all 
these approaches are limited by their inherently philocentric character, which 
is congenitally incapable of  thinking the future qua future (i.e. one that would 
be truly productive or inventive) precisely because it cannot envision a future that 
would not be expressed in philosophical terms, under the aegis of  philosophi-
cal reason and logos. What non-philosophy challenges, in other words, is the 
(usually unspoken) presupposition that philosophy as a modality of  thought, 
regardless of  its limitations or blindspots at any one moment, is constitu-
tionally sufficient to speak to or survey all possible phenomena and forms of  
3  Ibid.
4  François Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of  Philosophy, trans. Drew S. 
Burk and Anthony Paul Smith (Minneapolis, MN: Univocal, 2012), 9.
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knowledge. The time of  philosophy appears as the ultimate horizon for every 
possible thought. Non-philosophy, in contrast to this, offers “a theory and a 
pragmatics of  philosophical time on the basis of  the past as radical imma-
nence (of) time to self,” a “heretical time or the heretical conception of  time, 
without history or becoming,” that purports to have freed itself  from such 
philocentric confines.5
 It is this time-seen-in-One, and the notion of  futurality that comes 
along with it, that will compose the main focus of  this article. Exploring the 
Heideggerian distinction between the authentic and inauthentic temporali-
ties of  Dasein (which is explicitly mobilized in opposition to Aristotle’s con-
ceptualization of  time), and Jacques Derrida’s subsequent observation that 
Heidegger, for all his effort to subvert the metaphysical presentation of  time, 
remains thoroughly within the Aristotelian framework that he derides, I will 
argue that both of  these accounts still presume philosophy to be capable of  
describing the essence of  time (even if  this manifests in a deconstructed form), 
and as such, maintain a philocentrism that implicitly views all possible tempo-
ralities as cognizable within the temporal horizon of  philosophy itself. With 
this in mind, I will go on to discuss Laruelle’s attempt to articulate a non-
philosophical and inecstatic time, a time that is given without temporaliza-
tion, one that conceives of  a future no longer burdened by the illusions of  
philosophical sufficiency.
“World-time” and “now-time”: from Aristotle to Heidegger
Any discussion of  time within contemporary continental thought is indebted, 
for better or worse, to the work of  Heidegger, who proffers perhaps the most 
significant reconceptualization of  this concept since Augustine. Especially 
crucial here is the notion of  world-time: “the time which makes itself  public in 
the temporalizing of  temporality.”6 This is a time that belongs to the world 
– “world” understood here in the ontico-existentiell sense of  “that ‘wherein’ a 
factical Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’” – and in accordance with which 
we encounter entities within such a world.7 In the disclosure of  this world, 
by which these entities become intelligible as such, world-time is the ordi-
5  François Laruelle, Dictionary of  Non-Philosophy, trans. Taylor Adkins (Minneapolis, 
MN: Univocal, 2012), 148.
6  Heidegger, Being and Time, 414.
7  Ibid., 65. All emphasis in quotes is original unless otherwise noted [Ed.]. 
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nary, linear form of  time through which Dasein understands such entities as 
encountered in time. The ecstatico-horizontal temporalization of  world-time 
provides the time within which both the ready-to-hand and the present-at-
hand are constituted. 
 World-time is effectively the interface between an authentic, primor-
dial ecstatic unity of  Dasein, and a crude, uniform now-time: from Aristotle 
through to Bergson, Heidegger observes, “all discussions of  the concept of  
time have clung in principle to the Aristotelian definitions,” time being mea-
sured and understood in terms of  the homogeneous medium of  clock time, 
such that each moment of  time is conceived of  as merely one in an infinite 
series of  presents.8 The definition alluded to here is specifically Aristotle’s 
description of  time as “number of  motion in respect of  ‘before’ and ‘after’,” 
which follows the common-sense understanding of  time as that which is 
counted (and thus made present) as a pointer (be it the hand of  a clock or 
the shadow of  a sundial) passes over it, each moment forming an intemporal 
point-limit that demarcates the past and the future.9 Whereas world-time is 
datable, its concepts of  “now,” “then,” and “ago” being constituted in relation 
to the significance of  a human event, now-time is abstract, standardized, and 
linear, divorcing time from the world that it temporalizes.
 In order to escape this Aristotelian framework, Heidegger argues 
that time must be thought in terms of  three ecstases – “Being-already-in…,” 
“Being-ahead-of-itself,” and “Being-alongside…” – which correspond in turn 
with Dasein’s structure of  care, which “comprises in itself  facticity (thrown-
ness), existence (projection), and falling.”10 Superficially, it would be easy to 
view these three structures as correlating fairly neatly with the classical cat-
egories of  future, past, and present, respectively. Yet he is adamant that to do 
so would be to remain within the scope of  the vulgar, inauthentic interpreta-
tion of  time that he strives to denounce:
8  Ibid., 421. Heidegger’s preparedness here to lump Bergson together with the phi-
losophers of  Aristotelian clock-time is odd (given the consonances between their respective 
approaches to philosophy), and his justification – that Bergson merely reverses the Hegelian 
conflation of  time with space – infamously cursory and obscure. On this topic, see Heath 
Massey, The Origin of  Time: Heidegger and Bergson (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2015).
9  Aristotle, “Physics” The Basic Works of  Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New 
York: The Modern Library, 2001), 219b.
10  Heidegger, Being and Time, 284, 327.
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only in so far as Dasein is as an “I-am-as-having-been,” can Dasein come 
towards itself  futurally in such a way that it comes back. As authentically fu-
tural, Dasein is authentically as “having been.” Anticipation of  one’s uttermost 
and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one’s ownmost 
“been”. Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having 
been. The character of  “having been” arises, in a certain way, from the 
future.11
Authentic time, according to this account, is inescapably unitary, for none of  
these structures may be extricated from the others without flattening their re-
lations such that they return to the linear series of  presents that characterizes 
inauthentic existence. Our understanding of  time, therefore, and of  Being 
more generally, must begin with the inherent futurity of  Dasein as being, in 
that it is always anticipating, “always coming towards itself.”12 
 The future (that which is not-yet-now) does not arise from the present 
(the now); rather, through this ecstatic unity the present actually emerges from 
the future. “Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself – 
thrown possibility through and through,” such that “Dasein is in every case what 
it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility.”13 This Being-possible 
means in effect that Dasein is always oriented, or projected, toward the fu-
ture; its “potentiality-for-Being towards itself, for the sake of  itself ” always 
lies within the possibility of  “what is not yet actual and what is not at any time 
necessary.”14 To speak of  Dasein as projecting itself  is not to suggest that one 
plans out in advance one’s futurity, for “any Dasein has, as Dasein, already 
projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting,” and as long as it does 
this, it will always understand itself  in terms of  possibilities, albeit without 
ever actually being able to grasp thematically these possibilities into which it 
throws itself, given that the very nature of  projection relies upon the fact that 
it, “in throwing, throws before itself  the possibility as possibility, and lets it be 
as such.”15 Being, therefore, is always already ahead of  itself, coming into its 
own.
 Importantly, though, Derrida challenges the notion that this ecstatic 
11  Ibid., 326.
12  Ibid., 325.
13  Ibid., 143.
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid., 145.
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temporality of  Dasein actually marks a discrete break from the Aristotelian 
approach, arguing that “every text of  metaphysics carries within itself  ... both 
the so-called ‘vulgar’ concept of  time and the resources that will be borrowed 
from the system of  metaphysics in order to criticize that concept.”16 Aristotle 
does not simply reify the presence of  the present as “now” (νῦν); rather, he 
accounts for the now’s paradoxical nature as both being and non-being, pres-
ence and absence:
[o]ne part of  it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not 
yet. Yet time – both infinite time and any time you like to take – is made up 
of  these. One would naturally suppose that what is made up of  things which 
do not exist could have no share in reality.17
The conundrum Aristotle identifies here is that if  we consider time to be the 
coming-to-be and perishing of  these nows, then they cannot be, for they are 
in a constant state of  becoming. How can time have a share of  reality when 
nothing of  which it is composed is ever actually in a state of  being?
 Moreover, Aristotle notes, “if  a divisible thing is to exist, it is necessary 
that, when it exists, all or some of  its parts must exist,” and yet, when discuss-
ing time “some parts have been, while others have to be,” and thus it “is not 
held to be made up of  ‘nows’.”18 If  time were represented as a divisible line, 
then it would not actually be temporal, because it would involve multiple con-
current nows lined up next to each other, and time cannot be composed of  
more than one now at any one moment, for the now is constitutive of  this mo-
ment. Yet “we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking 
it by ‘before’ and ‘after’; and it is only when we have perceived ‘before’ and 
‘after’ in motion that we say that time has elapsed,” and as such, in some sense 
we must think time in exactly such a fashion – with the now as the point-limit 
– for it is only via such a conception that time is actually thinkable as such.19 
The strange, dual nature of  the now means that “every simultaneous time is 
self-identical; for the ‘now’ as a subject is an identity, but it accepts different 
attributes”: there is a certain shared identity to all nows, in the sense that they 
16  Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Gramme: Note On a Note from Being and Time” in 
Margins of  Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of  Chicago Press, 1982), 60.
17  Aristotle, “Physics,”, The Basic Works of  Aristotle, 217b-218a.
18  Ibid., 218a.
19  Ibid., 219a.
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must come-to-be, constituting the persistence of  time, and yet, each now must 
also be different.20 The now is always the same (in its being-now) but always 
different (in its becoming).
 In acknowledging this internal tension, contends Derrida, Aristotle 
establishes “both traditional metaphysical security, and, in its inaugural am-
biguity, the critique of  this security,” furnishing “the premises of  a thought of  
time no longer dominated simply by the present.”21 What is rejected as much 
in the Aristotelian and Bergsonian accounts of  time as in the Heideggarian 
division of  authentic and inauthentic time therefore is “not the gramme as 
such, but the gramme as a series of  points, as a composition of  parts each of  
which would be an arrested limit”: in both cases, it is acknowledged that to 
reduce time to a succession of  point-limits (nows) is to describe something 
that is fundamentally atemporal, given that it implies the simultaneous pres-
ence of  multiple nows.22 This acknowledgement in itself, however, does not 
demonstrate that the thought of  time wholly exceeds representation:
if  one considers now that the point, as limit, does not exist in act, is not (pres-
ent), exists only potentially and by accident, takes its existence only from line 
in act, then it is not impossible to preserve the analogy of  the gramme: on the 
condition that one does not take it as a series of  potential limits, but as a line 
in act, as a line thought on the basis of  its extremities and not of  its parts.23
To think time metaphysically, the point-limit cannot be conceived of  as exist-
ing in action (i.e. in its presence) for this would arrest the flow of  becoming 
by which the very notion of  time is characterized. The point-limit, therefore, 
exists only in potential: the now is a non-being, in the sense that is always 
already past, even whilst it constitutes the very possibility (and impossibility) 
of  being qua presence. This point in potentiality, however, is derived from the 
line in actuality, such that to think time in non-segmentary terms – instead of  
as a series of  present nows – is to think it rather “on the basis of  the telos of  
a gramme that is completed, in act, fully present, that keeps its tracing close to 
itself, that is, erases its tracing in a circle.”24
20  Ibid., 219b.
21  Derrida, Margins of  Philosophy,49.
22  Ibid., 59.
23  Ibid., 59-60.
24  Ibid., 60.
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The impenetrable circularity of  philosophical World-time
We can summarize Derrida’s argument as follows: the metaphysical presen-
tation of  time always already deconstructs itself  – given that it is necessarily 
premised upon the enigmatic double-nature of  the now as both being and 
non-being, act and potentiality – but it nonetheless remains under the author-
ity of  a broader metaphysics of  presence insofar as it recuperates this division 
between the presence of  a potential limit-point between a past and a future, 
and the presence of  a complete time in act. As a consequence, the Heidegge-
rian delimitation of  a vulgar, ordinary time (comprising both world-time and 
now-time) from an authentic and primordial temporality of  Dasein merely 
recapitulates in a more explicit manner the originary Aristotelian gesture, 
dividing the conception of  time between the now as point-limit and the now 
as circle:
Physics IV doubtless confirms the Heideggerian de-limitation. Without a 
doubt, Aristotle thinks time on the basis of  ousia as parousia, on the basis of  
the now, the point, etc. And yet an entire reading could be organized that 
would repeat in Aristotle’s text both this limitation and its opposite. And which 
made it appear that the de-limitation is still governed by the same concepts 
as the limitation.25
 From the perspective of  non-philosophy, however, the discovery of  
this deconstructive principle within the metaphysics of  time may undercut 
the hierarchical primacy of  the present qua presence, but it fails to illumi-
nate a more general or universal occlusion – that of  philosophical sufficiency. 
While Derrida is critical of  any attempt to straightforwardly enquire into the 
essence of  time, given that this question ends up covertly pre-determining the 
essence of essence in terms of  presence (thus inscribing this question within the 
semantic horizon of  the time that it seeks to interrogate), his conclusion that 
the concept of  time inevitably “names the domination of  presence” nonethe-
less makes recourse to a certain invocation of  essence, tying the concept of  
time to an elided absence (the trace) by which its coherence is ensured.26 Der-
rida therefore still subscribes to the “more-than-representative, more-than-
25  Ibid., 61
26  Ibid., 63.
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logocentric sufficiency, assurance, and security that philosophical decision even as 
illusion is necessary or belongs to the real.”27
 All of  these philosophers mentioned – Aristotle, Bergson, Heidegger, 
Derrida – are fundamentally searching for the essence of  time, to delimit the 
boundaries of  time as a concept, and they presume philosophical discourse to 
be sufficient for this task. Even Derrida, deeply committed to destabilizing the 
sureties of  metaphysical truth-claims, implicitly conceives of  philosophy as 
the ultimate horizon within which all such enquiries can and must occur. For 
Laruelle, this is indicative of  the unitary nature of  philosophy as a modality 
of  thought, internalizing within itself  its own critique: whilst deconstruction-
ists are more than happy to breach or dissolve the stable character of  philo-
sophical reason (in some cases proclaiming the destruction of  metaphysics or 
even the outright death of  philosophy), they do so whilst maintaining its over-
all validity, remaining content to “observe or aggravate the ruinous character 
of  the edifice without daring to really put it at the base in order to construct 
other things elsewhere.”28 For philosophy to think its other as its condition, as 
that which limits or restrains it, it must not only already take for granted its 
own sufficiency to think this alterity, but also project upon the latter a teleo-
logical function such that its existence is taken to be meaningful by virtue of  
its proximate connection to philosophy.
 In short, Derrida elucidates the finitude of  the philosophical concept 
in relation to its own other, but does so without ever leaving the borders of  
philosophical discourse proper, incorporating even différance within its tran-
scendental and metaphysical unity. Philosophy, according to the non-philo-
sophical project, is characterized by an operation of  mixing or blending, a 
unity-of-contraries that finds its first overt articulation in the Heraclitean logos. 
Thus, when philosophers strive to uncover the true essence of  time, they end 
up finding it in a mixed or blended form, one which transcends an empirical 
time-of-the-world in order to locate its transcendental origin or condition. 
Once again, we witness this unification of  contraries even in Derrida, who 
maintains a causal and productive relationship between the metaphysical 
construal of  time qua presence, and the ceaseless scission of  différance – “a dif-
ference still more unthought than the difference between Being and beings”– 
27  François Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, trans. Taylor Adkins (Minneapolis, 
MN: Univocal, 2012), 184.
28  François Laruelle, Principles of  Non-Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 201.
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as its condition of  simultaneous possibility and impossibility.29
 The problem here is that whilst, as Laruelle observes, post-Hegelian 
continental philosophy has strenuously attempted to “make of  time (of  his-
tory or even of  becoming) the essence of  the real, to desubstantialize the 
latter by the former, to align being with time or time-being with duration,” it 
effectuates this desubstantialization without ever abandoning the decisional 
structure whereby the real is bisected into time and its temporalizing condi-
tions, so that these opposed terms may in turn be united through a movement 
of  transcendence that passes from one to the other in a wholly reversible 
manner (since an a priori condition can only be meaningful as such in relation 
to a conditioned given, and vice-versa).30 Philosophers thus continually try to 
grasp at the essence of  time (and, within the post-Hegelian milieu, that of  the 
real also), and in their failure to do so, fall back into a unitary dissimulation 
of  time that merely reiterates the aforementioned Heraclitean postulate, the 
One-of-the-dyad.
 It is this congenital inability of  philosophy to think outside its own 
self-sustaining aesthetic and logic—given in the sensible data and concepts 
through which such data are to be comprehended in a single motion, such 
that the concepts would seem to not only provide the conditions for the exis-
tence of  sensibilia, but also the means by which it is legislated and judged—
with which non-philosophy takes particular umbrage: philosophy is able to 
make reference to the real (and more specifically, to tout its ability to identify 
the truth or essence of  such) because the image of  the world given to us by 
philosophers is one in which philosophy is deemed co-extensive or even syn-
onymous with reality. By presenting the real in this unitary (hallucinatory) 
form, the philosopher sustains the illusion that there is nothing outside of  
philosophy – that philosophy is spontaneously given and uniquely sufficient to 
speak to and for this world, with all other practices and modalities of  thought 
remaining in a state of  pre-philosophical naïvety.
 The “anguish and precariousness of  philosophy” – its simultaneous 
fascination and revulsion regarding these regional knowledges – is a result 
of  its internally contradictory outlook in relation to them: on the one hand, 
philosophy “manifests a claim to domination, legislation, grounding, critique,” 
demarcating a horizon that either always-already includes such proximate 
29  Derrida, Margins of  Philosophy, 67.
30  Laruelle, Dictionary of  Non-Philosophy, 146.
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knowledges within itself, or heralds the desire to colonize them; on the other 
hand, it must also “recognize the weakness of  this claim which is always in the 
process of  realization,” for the mere acknowledgement of  such knowledges 
is predicated upon a certain finitude.31 Key to the blinkered viewpoint of  
philosophy is this delimitation of  a horizon that is at once finite and infinite, 
setting immanent limits to its own capacities (in relation to regional knowl-
edges), only to then overcome these barriers through its transcendental claim 
to a co-determination of  the real:
[t]he superior or dominant place is in effect always occupied by philosophy: 
within the unification or intersection of  two regions, it is still philosophy as 
over-dominant, if  we can put it this way, that triumphs, the satisfaction of  
the need to philosophize; the synthesis is made to the benefit of  philosophy.32
Philosophy posits itself  as its own destiny, inscribed within a teleology that 
postulates and expects its inherent sufficiency for classifying and analyzing all 
extra-philosophical phenomena.
 This self-inscribed teleology, contends Laruelle, means that philoso-
phers feel they have no need to ever genuinely confront “the narcissism and 
the historicizing and textual auto-reference within which unitary thought 
seems to want to consume itself  until the end of  time.”33 Non-philosophy 
is founded upon the (highly instigative and controvertible) premise that the 
philosopher is the heir to a heritage that she or he merely invests in and per-
petuates, rather than ever truly creating anew. Even the success of  Plato, for 
all of  his apparent formal and conceptual innovation, is viewed by Laruelle 
as a consequence of  his possessing “the art of  ordering and hierarchizing 
the riches of  the past,” driven by the impulse to “save, conserve, or raise up 
the past.”34 Although philosophers have put forward innumerably variegated 
conceptions of  the future of  the world, far less consideration has been put 
into the question of  the future of  philosophy itself, and as a result, the pas-
sage from philosopher to philosopher, and from concept to concept, tends to 
be un-critically presented as following “a linear development of  thought, a 
31  Laruelle, Principles of  Non-Philosophy, 44.
32  Ibid., 43.
33  Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, 19.
34  François Laruelle, Anti-Badiou, trans. Robin Mackay (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 
25-26.
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definitive solving of  problems or an obsolescence of  philosophy” – a feature 
less obvious in continental (as opposed to analytic) philosophy, but one that 
still tends to determine the former’s image of  thought, inasmuch as it revolves 
around the seemingly-miraculous arrival of  the datable philosophical work.35
 Even the Deleuzian metaphilosophy – which attempts to avoid any 
such linear progression, proposing that whilst the life of  philosophers “con-
forms to the ordinary laws of  succession,” their conceptual personae “coexist 
and shine either as luminous points that take us through the components of  
a concept once more or as the cardinal points of  a stratum or layer that con-
tinually come back to us” – still subscribes to a model of  endless becoming-
philosophy.36 The future of  philosophy, from the Deleuzian perspective, is 
the eternal return of  the creative event, carrying on the philosophical legacy 
by “continually changing concepts without ever changing operations.“37 In 
short, then, the future of  philosophy is comprehended by philosophy in un-
mistakably philosophical terms, in accordance with the usual, metaphysical 
presentation of  time. Philosophy is treated as an object of  the world, even as 
it retains its supposed co-extensiveness with said world. 
The three clones of  time
Given that non-philosophy is always in some way parasitic, always based on 
“a transformation of  that self-referential usage of  philosophical language 
which regulates the statements of  philosophy, into a new usage,” it would not 
seem too aberrant to describe philosophy as existing in a state of  fallenness, in 
the specifically Heideggerian sense of  the word.38 Fallenness (or ensnarement) 
is of  course the ontologico-existential state of  inauthenticity for Dasein, the 
moment at which “Dasein is inclined to fall back upon its world (the world 
in which it is) and to interpret itself  in terms of  that world by its reflected 
light” and simultaneously fall prey “to the tradition of  which it has more or 
less explicitly taken hold.”39 Dasein loses sight of  the truth of  Being, instead 
35  Ibid., 20.
36  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 59.
37  François Laruelle, “What Can Non-Philosophy Do?,” The Non-Philosophy Project, 
edited by Gabriel Alkon and Boris Gunjevic (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2012), 46.
38  François Laruelle, “A Summary of  Non-Philosophy,” From Decision to Heresy: Experi-
ments in Non-Standard Thought, edited by Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2012), 289.
39  Heidegger, Being and Time, 21.
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focusing its attention upon those ontic entities that populate the world. World-
time concomitantly represents the fallen, inauthentic character of  ordinary 
temporal reckoning, its datable, spanned, and public nature demonstrative of  
this concern with and absorption in Being-with-one-another.
 Insofar as their boundaries remain entirely co-extensive, non-philos-
ophy refuses to treat philosophy as an existent object within a world that pre-
cedes it; conversely, it regards the World as a unitary mixture of  philosophy 
and world that is given through philosophical structuration. The World is the 
primary object of  philosophical reflection, the given exteriority from which 
philosophy takes its departure, the mixture-form of  an ontical experience of  
being grounded in the temporality of  world-time and an ecstatico-horizon-
tal transcendence, departing from these ontic beings toward the ground of  
their Being, recognizing the ontological difference that distinguishes these 
two terms. Put another way, the World is the philosophical hallucination of  the One: 
fundamental ontological Being is posited as that which holds primacy and 
authority over not only all existent beings, but also over the unitary identity of  
the World, which philosophy effectuates through its traversal of  this ontologi-
cal difference.
 If  the World is given through philosophy and is, in effect, synonymous 
with philosophy (marking the precise boundaries of  the latter’s noetic pos-
sibility), then it follows that philosophical thought remains entangled within 
and operates according to a World-time of  its own creation. This is a form 
of  temporality that “elevates time to the World’s form under philosophy’s 
authority,” marking a specifically philosophical experience of  time, “the en-
semble of  decisions-of-time already carried out or still to come in accordance 
with the World” – that is, it is within this World-time that the effectivity of  
the philosophical decision (which in each instance determines the particular 
terms to be mixed) is temporalized, such that it is made manifest within a dat-
able and linear history of  thought.40 The philosophical field (what Deleuze re-
fers to as the “plane of  immanence”) upon which these decisions are effectu-
ated remains in a state of  constant re-organization and re-distribution as new 
concepts are created and old ones revitalized, but this perpetual movement 
always remains bounded by the horizon of  philosophical sufficiency and the 
undecidable mélange of  immanence and transcendence that characterizes 
the decisional structure of  which all philosophers and philosophical concepts 
40  Laruelle, Dictionary of  Non-Philosophy, 147.
‡ChiaSma   #3
24
partake.
 The World-time of  philosophy is inhibited by its failure to conceive 
of  the future (of  philosophy, and thus, accordingly, of  the World also) as any-
thing other than a perpetuation of  its invariant structure, for the assurance 
of  a constant re-configuration of  its terms within the framework of  decision 
(a guarantee underwritten by the inability of  philosophy to speak of  the One 
as anything other than unitary – and thus divided – in essence) means that 
the future of  philosophy is always already filled with content. Philosophy may 
experiment with this decisional structure, but it never abandons it, and as a 
result, it can never truly reinvent itself. It can only enact becomings within 
the confines of  its own unitary circularity. It is for exactly this reason that we 
might describe philosophy as fallen or ensnared in the Heideggarian sense: 
it is caught within a perennial presence, comprehending the past as an accu-
mulation of  prior decisions to be recalled and re-worked in the furtherance 
of  the overall surety of  philosophy as a project and a discipline, and likewise 
the future as a never-ending succession of  decisions to come. Philosophical 
World-time is inherently historical in character, and as such, cannot think out-
side of  the boundaries of  the specular philosophical circle. The only end that 
the philosopher can truly countenance is that of  a complete closure, “winding 
around itself, gathering itself  and withdrawing from thought.”41
 As noted in the introduction, part of  Laruelle’s goal in proposing a 
non-philosophical approach to studying philosophy (and hence one that is not 
necessarily in thrall to historicizing preconceptions) is to “open up the dimen-
sion of  a radical future” for philosophy, the goal here being not to reject philo-
sophical praxis (in spite of  the unnecessarily derisive or even actively hostile 
tone that his writing often exhibits), but to bring forth “a radically experimental 
practice of  philosophy that is foreign to its circle or its philocentrism.”42 In order to do 
this, he articulates a time-according-to-the-One, which suspends the sufficiency of  
philosophical World-time such that it can “only be a material or occasion for 
naming, indicating and effectuating the vision-in-One (of) time.“43 No longer 
is World-time treated, as it is in its philosophical usage, as the temporalizing 
horizon of  all thought; instead, non-philosophy clones it as an inert mate-
rial instance: a perpetual, static present stripped of  all pretensions to cogniz-
41  François Laruelle, “What Can Non-Philosophy Do?,” The Non-Philosophy Project 
(New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2012), 197.
42  Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, 123.
43  Laruelle, Dictionary of  Non-Philosophy, 146.
‡ChiaSma   #3
25
ing either the past or the future. World-time is henceforth regarded not as a 
temporalizing time in its own right, but as a single everlasting moment – a 
world-Present – within a broader division of  time thought according to the 
radical, finite immanence of  the One, making usage (as material) of  the three 
classical, ordinary (Aristotelian) states of  time (past, present, and future). This 
immanence refers not to the Being or essence of  which philosophy attempts 
to speak, but rather the necessary but insufficient condition of  thought; the 
enigmatic, ineffable, and idempotent identity-in-the-last-instance of  philoso-
phy and all of  its supposed exteriorities.
 This time is a time-seen-in-One, a purely transcendental and subjec-
tive temporality that is cloned from (but is not synonymous with) the present 
of  World-time, and is determined-in-the-last-instance by the One. Most cru-
cially, it can
only be from its position the radical past of  pure immanence and of  identity, 
a past which has not only never been present but also will never be present 
in the future (and for the future) as trace, but which will remain immanent 
past even in the future that it clones from world-time’s present.44
The One is not temporal in any philosophical sense of  the word, for it cannot 
ever be reduced to ontological qualities, but through this process of  cloning a 
certain expression of  time is given. This is a time that is given-without-given-
ness, a time-without-temporalization, grounded in “a time of  the past which 
simultaneously possesses a primacy over both synchrony and diachrony and 
determines these transcendent dimensions themselves, at least insofar as they 
form the object of  philosophical interpretations.”45 It is a radical past, an im-
manent time “of  which one could say that it is-without-existing or even that 
it is a non-temporal time.”46 It is not the past of  philosophical World-time, 
which always remains a present even when it has passed into the past, nor 
is it an absolute past forgotten thanks to hypomnēsis but recoverable through 
anámnēsis (which would simply reproduce the classical metaphysical distinc-
tion between presence and absence, considering philosophy sufficient to both 
forget and retrieve its truths) – it is a past that always is and always will be in 
the past (one might say that it is a past-without-passage, inasmuch as its condi-
44  Ibid.
45  Ibid., 147.
46  Ibid.
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tion as past is in no way determined by a present that precedes it, and from 
which it passed from existence into non-existence), such that “even effectu-
ated as future, remains in its necessary sterility and in no way participates in 
the world-present such as non-philosophy conceives it.”47
 Such a past would seem immediately reminiscent of  the “inefficacious, 
impassive, and sterile splendor” of  the Deleuzian sense-event, which spreads 
out toward both the past and the future whilst eluding the present, and perhaps 
also of  the motionless Bergsonian memory, irreducible to the present and yet 
constantly feeding into it.48 There are, however, two crucial differences that 
separate these models of  time from the inecstatic clones proposed by Laruelle. 
Firstly, as Katerina Kolozova writes, both Bergson and Deleuze understand 
time in terms of  a “future always already collapsing into the returning past”: 
although both philosophers reject the straightforward succession of  now-time 
and clock-time, they do so in favour of  an indivisible continuity between past 
and present, ensuring these two terms’ perpetual convertibility.49 Secondly, 
both of  these concepts operate “as functions of  a worldly time,” immanent to 
the field of  consciousness (albeit an ontological rather than psychological con-
sciousness), and thus inherently philosophizable.50 What Laruelle attempts to 
describe instead is a past that determines “the present as material for the fu-
ture,” but does so in an entirely unilateral manner – the past in this account 
does not commingle with the present (such that it would find itself  reversible 
with World-time, and hence philosophizable); rather, it is a radical past, “found 
and experienced only in-past in its own immanence,” determining the present only 
in-the-last-instance (that is, it constitutes a necessary but insufficient condition 
for the World-time of  the present, such that it will always remain foreclosed 
and indifferent to the temporal horizon of  the World).51
 We therefore have two clones or instances of  a theoretical time that 
eludes philosophical temporalization and the presuppositions of  sufficiency 
that come along with it: the first is the past as given, an immanent One-
time that does not and cannot participate in the present, whilst the second 
47  Ibid.
48  Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of  Sense, trans. Mark Lester (London and New York: Con-
tinuum, 1990), 23.
49  Katerina Kolozova, Cut of  the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2014), 61.
50  Laruelle, Future Christ, 75.
51  Ibid., 75-76.
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is the present of  philosophical World-time, which forecloses all thought of  
this One-time of  the past by seeking out the supposed essence of  time in the 
decisional mixture-form of  time and World, and from which non-philosophy 
borrows the metaphysical syntax and idiom (albeit disarming it of  its preten-
sions in the process) by which its theory of  time is articulated. The ultimate 
aim of  non-philosophy, however, is only truly articulated in relation to the 
third clone, “the instance of  the transcendental future or of  temporalizing 
force” which is “deployed from the past-in-One to the world-Present.“52
 This cloned future, like that of  the past, is not merely a present-to-
come nor even a thrown projection (both of  which would encase it within the 
divided unity of  philosophical time), but the future as “identity cloned or pro-
duced on the basis of  world-time as One.“53 Such futurality is obtained not by 
mixing the immobile finitude of  the past and the mobile time of  the present, 
for this would simply recapitulate the reversible and undecidable relationship 
between time and World furnished by philosophy; instead, the future is the 
transcendental identity of  the past unilaterally oriented toward the present-
World. This future is what Laruelle often refers to as the force-(of)-thought, 
a transcendental organon that transforms the philosophical World-time into 
an inert a priori material. It is in and through this future – a future that will 
never come-to-be, which will always remain as such, ensconced in its futural 
identity – that the radical past is effectuated under the contingent conditions 
of  World-time (although the unilateral directionality of  this determination-
in-the-last-instance means that the past is not actually affected by this effec-
tuation), and this World-time is in turn rendered as a material capable of  
transformation through non-philosophical means. The future, put straight-
forwardly, signifies the non-philosophical transformation of  philosophical 
material, facilitated by the suspension of  the latter’s sufficiency (and with this, 
its seemingly inescapable circularity). 
Futurality and the democracy of  thought
Robin Mackay expresses a common frustration amongst those who study 
Laruelle when he remarks that “it is difficult to avoid the impression of  a con-
tinual anticipation of  the moment when non-philosophy will begin to func-
tion” – whilst Laruelle has built up a formidable corpus of  work over the past 
52  Ibid.
53  Ibid.
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four decades, one can quite justifiably find tiresome his tendency to reiterate, 
with seemingly minor variation, the same arguments over and over again 
without ever giving a strong or clear articulation of  what a non-philosophical 
comprehension of  philosophy (vision-in-One) actually comprises.54 Laruelle 
seems to continually describe the method of  non-philosophy without ever 
actually putting it into action.
 This, however, is not so much a failing of  the non-philosophical project 
as an indication of  its attempt to subvert the philosophical (Worldly) structur-
ation of  time: the transformation of  philosophical materials, the effectuation 
of  the One-time of  the past via the inert data of  the world-Present, is cloned 
as a future, but this is not a future-to-come (which would imply its ontological 
reversibility with the present, such that what is now futural will at some point 
become present); rather, it is a future that “is foreclosed to past and present 
History, just as it is foreclosed to the place of  places, the World,” hence lacking 
all positive content (and with it, all possibility of  speculation and prediction), 
remaining entirely “unimaginable and unintelligible.”55 Time-seen-in-One is 
not an object to be thought (as with the metaphysical presentation of  time), 
but a thought in its own right, a thought already given in-the-last-instance. 
Non-philosophy “makes a clean cut at once with the contents of  the past and 
of  the present as well as with their sufficiency, in the name of  a radical past 
and that which does not pass in being-in-the-Past,” and it does so in the name 
of  a Stranger-subject who is synonymous with the ordinary essence of  the 
human individual.56
 The non-philosophical clone of  the future is produced in the form 
of  this Stranger – “the experience of  a time of  exteriority or stranger time” 
– who is not thrown into World-time, but instead is directed toward it, indi-
cating those usages of  its material that do not make recourse to philosophical 
presumptions of  sufficiency.57 The Stranger does not substantiate the future, 
54  Robin Mackay, “Introduction: Laruelle Undivided,” From Decision to Heresy: Experi-
ments in Non-Standard Thought, edited by Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2012), 28.
55  Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of  Philosophy, 18.
56  François Laruelle, Future Christ, trans. Anthony Paul Smith (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2010), 18. On Laruelle’s frequent identification of  the Stranger-subject with 
the so-called “ordinary man,” see Thomas Sutherland and Elliot Patsoura, “Human-in-the-
Last-Instance: The Concept of  ‘Man” Between Foucault and Laruelle,” Parrhesia 24 (2015): 
285-311.
57  Laruelle, Dictionary of  Non-Philosophy, 148.
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for the latter is already given through the One, but it recovers through the 
transformation of  these philosophical materials a futurality “that forces us to 
invent the present as transformation of  the past.”58 The Stranger inserts the 
future into World-time, and thus into history also, but it does so from a posi-
tion of  irreducible exteriority, manifesting a time that cannot be placed within 
the reversible mixture of  philosophical decision. This unilateralized subject, 
as a force-(of)-thought, transforms philosophy into an occasional cause with-
out itself  being transformed by philosophy: it does not view the One as an 
object or Being to be thought, but as that which is foreclosed and indifferent 
to all thought, but determines it in-the-last-instance.
 This movement of  transformation is central to non-philosophy, which 
aims to change the way that we view philosophy, without negating its impor-
tance or utility. It involves, as John Mullarkey and Anthony Paul Smith as-
tutely describe, “a revision of  philosophy somewhat like a figure-ground shift 
in perception,” bringing to the fore those elements of  thought that philosophy 
masks in its endless quest for the essence of  Being (and its temporalization).59 
Non-philosophy has no interest in the present, the established, and the pre-
fabricated except to the extent that they might be transformed by the futural 
in order to bring to the fore that which has been excluded or subordinated by 
the authoritarian impulses of  philosophical reason:
[t]his does not concern reshuffling what already exists or what has already 
taken place, of  ‘making something new out of  the old’, but of  discovering the 
new itself, the statements and forms of  thought that are not already given 
other than through their data but which we ignore because we have not real-
ized them or manifested them and which thus, in a sense, have not yet taken 
place in thought itself.60
 The ultimate aim of  such a transformation, and of  this futurality 
in general, is “a new democratic order of  thought” diametrically opposed to the 
arrogance and specularity of  philosophical sufficiency, attempting to avoid 
“conflictuality between philosophies and between philosophy and regional 
knowledges.”61 This noetic democracy has nothing to do with making any 
58  Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of  Philosophy, 76.
59  John Mullarkey and Anthony Paul Smith, “Introduction: The Non-Philosophical 
Inversion: LarueIle’s Knowledge Without Domination,” Laruelle and Non-Philosophy (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 5.
60  Laruelle, Principles of  Non-Philosophy, 163.
61  Ibid., 13.
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claim about things in themselves, as if  other disciplines (science, art, etc.) 
are just as or more capable of  speaking to a stable external reality, for this 
would simply project a philosophical inference upon these extra-philosoph-
ical knowledges and practices. Instead, it is fundamentally about the co-ex-
istence and equality of  all such disciplines and objects (materials), all recog-
nized as incomplete and insufficient, and all determined-in-the-last-instance 
by the One. Through this non-decisional democracy, a new space of  thought 
is claimed to be created, one outside of  philosophical sufficiency, even if  phil-
osophical concepts and ideas are incorporated within it. If  the World-time 
of  philosophy is characterized by an inexhaustible demand for finality, its 
operations teleologically oriented toward the preservation of  its structure and 
consequent specular circularity (such that the specific contents of  any one 
decision are of  little interest to it), the futurality of  non-philosophy, as seen-
in-One, is decidedly opposed to all such finality, concerned with “only the us-
age of  means in view of  the invention of  existence.”62 In the last instance, all 
knowledges, philosophical or otherwise, are “transformed into mere means,” 
deprived of  any presupposed sufficiency such that they may be the catalysts 
for new, inventive modes of  thought outside philosophical parameters.63
 It was Heidegger, Laruelle argues, “who unleashed the absurd de-
lirium of  ‘total questioning’” – the former, of  course, seeking to reconfigure 
philosophy, directing it away from its concern with ontic beings, and back 
toward a more fundamental (but largely forgotten) enquiry into the nature 
of  Being itself.64 This incessant questioning is, from the non-philosophical 
perspective, symptomatic of  the circularity of  the philosophical logos, always 
searching for certitude but never actually reaching it. Philosophy constantly 
enquires into the essence of  being, the nature of  the real, but this act of  in-
terrogation is precisely the problem: the real is already there, already given 
to us – as soon as we enquire into its being, however, we are immediately led 
away from this fundamental truth, finding ourselves ensnared instead within 
the transcendence of  the logos. Laruelle instead declares the need to “affirm 
the primacy of  the answer over questions,”65 bringing into focus that which is 
“already given even outside every operation of  givenness, ontological or scien-
62  Laruelle, Anti-Badiou, 24.
63  Ibid.
64  Laruelle, “What Can Non-Philosophy Do?,” The Non-Philosophy Project, 207.
65  Ibid., 207-208.
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tific, which would precisely possibilize it,”66 and as a result cannot be fitted to 
an ecstatic unity of  time, let alone the successive “nows” of  ordinary temporal 
reckoning. The futurality of  non-philosophy, by means of  which it attempts to 
instantiate a time of  invention opposed to the temporalization of  World-time, 
is founded upon “an intra-temporal order that supposes the arrow of  worldly 
time oriented from the future toward the past across the present.”67
    ‡ ‡ ‡
Where philosophy can only think the future of  thought in the terms of  its own 
structural and syntactical recapitulation, non-philosophy by contrast attempts 
to foreground another future, one that is foreclosed to the effectivity of  the 
present (philosophical World-time), and yet makes usage of  this present as an 
inert and contingent material a priori, a radical (and thus finite) immanence 
expunged of  all pretense to sufficiency and teleological auto-legitimacy. This 
is not an abstract utopia still-to-come, nor a perpetually deferred messianism, 
but a celebration of  a time of  thought, a time of  the Stranger-subject, which 
does not aim at teleological ends, but strives instead to emphasize a lived ex-
perience incapable of  being reduced to such external determinants. The goal 
of  non-philosophy, in this context, is not to diminish or dismiss the ceaseless 
circuit of  World-time, but to remind us that another perspective on time is 
possible – a time-seen-in-One, that makes no claim to determining the real, 
and yet is identical with it in the last instance. The future, when thought ac-
cording to the One, is a transformation of  philosophical materials (the inert a 
priori) beyond the horizon of  philosophical possibility.
66  Laruelle, Principles of  Non-Philosophy, 92.
67  Laruelle, Anti-Badiou, 23.
